We develop an analytically tractable two-country model that marries a full account of global macroeconomic dynamics to a supply framework based on monopolistic competition and sticky nominal prices. The model offers simple and intuitive predictions about exchange rates and current accounts that sometimes differ sharply from those of either modern flexible-price intertemporal models or traditional sticky-price Keynesian models. Our analysis leads to a novel perspective on the international welfare spillovers due to monetary and fiscal policies.
of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Ball and Romer (1989) in an analytically tractable, dynamic, two-country framework. Section II sets out an infinite-horizon monetary model of a monopolistically competitive world economy. We show how to solve for the long-run and short-run equilibria of a log-linearized version of the model. In Section III we analyze positive and normative aspects of monetary and fiscal policy. Section IV catalogs a number of possible extensions of the model, and Section V presents conclusions.
Various elements of our approach can be found in earlier work by several authors. Each component of Mussa's (1984) aggregative model is inspired by individual maximization, but the model as a whole lacks an integrative foundation. McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and Stockman and Ohanian (1993) develop numerical sticky-price models that incorporate intertemporal maximization but lack foundations on the supply side. The model of Calvo and V6gh (1993) assumes sticky prices and demand-determined output but presents no rationale for the latter assumption. Also, its small-country setting prevents analysis of international transmission issues. Romer (1993) models a world of two interacting monopolistically competitive economies, but his analysis is static and its microfoundations are not fully specified. Dixon (1993) surveys other static open-economy models based on imperfect competition. Perhaps the closest precursor to our study is the paper by Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) ; but its assumption of perfectly pooled international risks, aside from uneasily matching its pricing and rationing assumptions, precludes discussion of the international wealth redistributions that are central to our analysis. ' 
II. Macroeconomic Policies in a Two-Country Model with Monopolistic Competition: Flexible Prices
In this section we describe the setup of the model and some of its properties when nominal output prices are flexible.
A. Preferences, Technology, and Market Structure
The world is inhabited by a continuum of individual producers, indexed by z E [0, 1], each of whom produces a single differentiated ' Recently Beaudry and Devereux (1994) have explored multiple equilibria within a related framework with flexible prices, investment, and increasing returns. They focus on an equilibrium isomorphic to one with predetermined nominal goods prices. Several of the properties of that equilibrium (e.g., long-run real effects due to purely nominal shocks) are consistent with predictions of our model. (1) where 0 > 1. The foreign consumption index C* is defined analogously (throughout, asterisks denote foreign variables).
There are no impediments or costs to trade between the countries. Let E be the nominal exchange rate, defined as the home-currency price of foreign currency, p(z) the domestic-currency price of good z, and p*(z) the price of the same good in foreign currency. Then the law of one price holds for every good, so that p(z) = Ep*(z). 
There is an integrated world capital market in which both countries can borrow and lend. The only asset they trade is a real bond, denominated in the composite consumption good. Let r, denote the real interest rate earned on bonds between dates t and t + 1, and let F, and M, denote the stocks of bonds and domestic money held by a home resident entering date t + 1. Residents of a country derive utility from that country's currency only, and not from foreign cur2The price index is defined as the minimal expenditure of domestic money needed to purchase a unit of C. We assume that home and foreign government purchases of consumption goods do not directly affect private utility. Per capita real home government consumption expenditure, G, is a composite of government consumptions of individual goods, g(z), in the same manner as private consumption; for simplicity, we assume identical weights.5 The same is true for G*. Since Ricardian equivalence holds 3 Here we adopt a money-in-the-utility-function approach to introducing currency, but a cash-in-advance version of the model yields qualitatively similar results (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). The most significant difference in the cash-in-advance model is that welfare results on the international transmission of policies (see Sec. IIIC) do not depend on any parameter assumptions. Feenstra (1986) discusses the equivalence of money-in-the-utility-function and transaction-technology approaches to money demand. 4 A more general formulation than eq. (6) allows the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, a, to differ from one and the elasticity of disutility from output, denoted by p. ' 1, to differ from two:
Allowing for this more general formulation enriches the comparative statics results but is not essential for any of the central points made below. For a discussion of the more general case, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994 
is world private consumption demand, which producers take as given, and Gw nGt + (1-n)G*
is world government demand. Equation (8) makes use of (2) and (4), which imply that the real price of good z is the same at home and abroad. Each individual producer has a degree of monopoly power. Thus, in the aggregate, a country faces a downward-sloping world demand curve for its output, as in Dornbusch (1976) . Purchasing power parity holds for consumer price indexes (eq. [4]), but only because both countries consume identical commodity baskets. Purchasing power parity does not hold for national output deflators, and thus the terms of trade can change.6 B. Individual Maximization Use (8) to eliminate Pt(z) from (5),7 and then maximize lifetime utility (6) subject to the resulting budget constraint, taking world demand, The model can be extended to give the government a preference for home goods, but the case in the text is notationally simpler. 6 In an extended version of the model incorporating nontraded goods, many of the basic results derived below still follow despite the fact that eq. (4) need no longer hold. 7 The substitution yields p1(z)y'(z) = PtY1(Z)(0-1)/e(Ctw + GwI'l1.
Cw + Gw, as given. Define the home-currency nominal interest rate on date t, it, by I + it = p (I + rt),
with an analogous definition for the foreign-currency nominal interest rate. Note that, because purchasing power parity holds, real interest rate equality implies uncovered interest parity: l+ i= E~ (I + i*). 
Equations (12) All producers in a country are symmetric, which implies that they set the same price and output in equilibrium. Let p(h) be the homecurrency price of a typical home good and p*(f ) the foreign-currency price of a typical foreign good; y and y* are the corresponding output levels. If composite consumption is constant in both countries, then each country's intertemporal budget constraint requires that real consumption spending be equal to net real interest payments from abroad plus real domestic output less real government spending.'0 Thus steady-state per capita consumption levels are 
where we have used the fact that at the initial symmetric steady state, Iio(h) = Eo0*(f). Next, take a population-weighted average of (5) and its foreign counterpart. Combining the result with (7) and (9) To solve the model, we still need the intertemporal budget constraints, which are implicit in equations (19) and ( 
" The mechanics of solving the model are greatly simplified by exploiting the symmetry across countries. In particular, it is very straightforward to solve for differences between home and foreign variables, and for population-weighted sums. The efficacy of this approach will be apparent in Sec. IIIB when we solve for the short-run exchange rate and interest rate. For a more extended discussion, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) . and C*A _ n (1 + rdF+ ( n) dG (n + 0 ) dG* (38) 2 0 v Consider equation (37) for home private consumption. An exogenous increase dF in home per capita foreign assets would increase steady-state consumption by the amount UdF were output exogenous. Instead, consumption increases here by less (since 0 > 1). The reason is that higher wealth leads to some reduction in work effort and production: as (29) shows, higher consumption lowers the marginal utility of consumption and, thus, marginal revenue measured in utility units. We also see from (37) that a steady-state rise in foreign government consumption increases domestic private consumption because part of the spending falls on domestic output, which rises in response. When steady-state home government consumption rises, however, home private consumption falls. There is a positive effect on output, as we shall explain in a moment, but it is more than offset by a higher domestic tax burden. Positive output effects do, however, allow private consumptions to fall by less than the associated tax increases.
To see the effects of net foreign assets and fiscal policies on outputs and the terms of trade, observe that equations ( 
Equations (39) and (40) show the multiplier effects of domestic government spending on output emphasized by Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989) . Higher lump-sum taxes cause producers to cut consumption but also to work harder. One can show that the net stimulus to aggregate demand is greater than under perfect competition. Equation ( 
III. The Two-Country Model with Sticky Prices
We are now ready to understand the short-run behavior of exchange rates, the current account, and other key variables. In the short run, nominal producer prices p(h) and p*(f) are predetermined; that is, they are set a period in advance but can be adjusted fully after one period. We shall not explicitly model the underlying source of stickiness here, though one can straightforwardly reinterpret all the results below in a setting with menu costs of price adjustment A la Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b), Mankiw (1985) , or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).14
A. Short-Run Equilibrium Conditions
With preset nominal prices, output becomes demand determined for small enough shocks. Because a monopolist always prices above marginal cost, it is profitable to meet unexpected demand at the preset price.15 In the short run, therefore, the equations equating marginal 12 This proportionality follows from the specific types of shocks assumed and does not hold in general. Permanent productivity shocks, which we shall mention later, would cause a negative correlation between a country's terms of trade and its consumption. National bias in government spending also would modify the simple proportionality in (41).
1 In other types of models-e.g., in an overlapping generations model-a transfer of assets has only temporary effects since the generations that receive the transfer eventually die out.
14 One can potentially extend the model to incorporate richer price dynamics, e.g., staggered price setting. Pricing-to-market issues (e.g., Dornbusch 1987; Krugman 1987) do not arise here because there are no impediments to trade. 15 It would be more profitable still to raise the price if this were possible in the short run. If there is an unexpected fall in demand and the monopolist cannot cut the price, there is no choice but to produce and sell less. revenue and marginal cost in the flexible-price case, (29) and (30), need not hold. Instead, output is determined entirely by the demand equations, (27) and (28).
Although prices are preset in terms of the producers' own currencies, the foreign-currency price of a producer's output must change if the exchange rate moves. How do exchange rate changes affect relative prices and demands in the short run? With rigid output prices, equations (24) and (25) 
In (44) and (45), and henceforth, we use hatted variables without time subscripts or overbars to denote short-run deviations from the symmetric steady-state path. Combining these price changes with (27) and (28) In the last section, we solved for the new steady state as a function of the permanent changes in money supplies and government spending, as well as the change in net foreign assets (the current account). The change in net foreign assets, however, is endogenous and can be determined only in conjunction with a full solution of the model's intertemporal equilibrium.
In the long run here, current accounts are balanced, as implied by the steady-state conditions (19) and (20). In the short run, however, the home country's per capita current-account surplus is given by The only essential difference is that in (51), relative money demand depends on consumption differences, not on output differences as the monetary model supposes. In the present model, the decision to hold money involves an opportunity cost that depends on the marginal utility of consumption. A prediction that money demand depends on consumption or expenditure rather than output is common, however, to many other intertemporal monetary models.'8 A recognition that consumption rather than output enters money demand has potentially important empirical implications, especially in an open economy that can smooth its consumption through foreign borrowing and lending. For example, transitory output shocks that induce permanent relative consumption movements will have permanent exchange rate effects.'9
Consider the classic Dornbusch (1976) exercise of an unanticipated permanent rise in the relative home money supply. To see the exchange rate implications of equation (51) 
Thus E = E. The exchange rate jumps immediately to its long-run level despite the inability of prices to adjust in the short run. The intuition behind this result is apparent from equation (51). If consumption differentials and money differentials are both expected to be constant, then agents must expect a constant exchange rate as well. Indeed, although we have considered only permanent money supply shocks, the random-walk behavior of consumption differences simplifies the analysis of more general shocks. For more general money shock processes, the usual forward solution to (51) 
This relationship shows the domestic currency depreciation needed to raise relative home output enough to justify a given permanent rise in relative home consumption; it therefore is upward sloping. Figure 1 shows the shift of the initial MM schedule to M'M' that occurs when there is a permanent unanticipated relative home money supply shock of size MA -MA?*. The intersection of M' M' and GG is the short-run equilibrium. The domestic currency depreciates, but by an amount proportionally smaller than the increase in the relative home money supply. Since E = E, this is true in the long run as well. 21 The exchange rate rises less than the relative domestic money supply because, as figure 1 also shows, domestic relative consumption must rise. With nominal prices fixed in the short run, the initial currency depreciation switches world demand toward domestic products and causes a short-run rise in relative domestic income.22 Home residents save part of this extra income: by running a current-account surplus, they smooth the increase in their relative consumption over the future.
The exchange rate change is smaller the less monopoly power producers have, that is, the larger is the price elasticity of demand, 0. As 0 > -and a perfectly competitive economy is approached, GG becomes horizontal and the exchange rate effects of monetary changes disappear. If domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes in demand and their nominal prices are fixed, there is no scope for an exchange rate change.23 This diagrammatic analysis extends easily to the case of temporary money shocks. The MM equation (52) The possibility that money shocks may have long-lasting real effects would seem to be quite general, and not simply an artifact of this particular model. As long as there exists any type of short-run nominal rigidities, unanticipated money shocks are likely to lead to international capital flows. The resulting transfers will extend the real effects of the shock beyond the initial sticky-price time horizon. In our infinitely lived agent model with intertemporally separable utility, the real effects are permanent; but in an overlapping generations setting, the effects should still last much longer than, say, the year or two horizon of a typical nominal wage contract. Of course, one must be careful not to overstate the importance of the long-run terms-of-trade effects since, as we have shown, they are in general an order of magnitude smaller than the short-run terms-of-trade effects.
One can ask whether Dornbusch (1976) type exchange rate overshooting occurs here, although the issue is complicated by the longrun nonneutrality of money. The more interesting question is whether sticky prices lead to more or less exchange rate volatility than one would observe in a world of flexible prices. In the present model, preset prices actually reduce exchange rate volatility due to monetary shocks. The fact that the inflating country experiences an improvement in its long-run terms of trade tempers the need for initial nominal depreciation. In the Appendix we present a model with sticky-price nontraded consumption goods in which a Dornbusch overshooting result can hold. Given the lack of empirical support for the overshooting hypothesis, however, it is unclear that this should be regarded as an essential property of an exchange rate 
where MW nM + (1-n)M*.
A monetary expansion either at home or abroad lowers the world real interest rate in proportion to the increase in the "world money supply" MW and, thus, raises global consumption demand. The liquidity effect is greater the higher is e, which is inversely related to the interest elasticity of money demand. Relatively interest inelastic money demand (a high value of e) means that a monetary expansion will cause a proportionally large decline in the real interest rate. As in equation (18), there is no effect on the long-run real interest rate, which is tied to the rate of time preference.
What about the nominal interest rate? One can show that a permanent monetary expansion in either country lowers nominal interest rates worldwide provided e > 1. (This probably is the empirically relevant case.) While a monetary expansion raises global demand in the short run by lowering the world real interest rate, it has asymmetric output effects in the two countries if the exchange rate changes. Equations (46) and (47) show the short-run output changes. Consider the effects of a unilateral increase in the home money supply. The world real interest rate falls and world demand rises, but because the domestic currency depreciates (E > 0), some world demand is shifted toward home products at foreign producers' expense. As a result, home out-put rises relatively more; in fact, foreign output actually can fall.26 A similar ambiguity is familiar from two-country versions of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model.27
C. Welfare Analysis of International Monetary Transmission
On a superficial reading, the preceding analysis suggests that the effects of a home monetary expansion on foreign welfare easily can be negative. In the long run, foreign agents work harder but, because of foreign debt and a deterioration in their terms of trade, consume less. Moreover, foreign output may fall in the short run. But even in that case there are some short-run benefits for foreigners: they enjoy more leisure, improved terms of trade, and consumption higher than income. The advantage of our dynamic utility-theoretic approach is that the overall welfare effect of these opposing forces can be rigorously evaluated. As in Section IIIB, monetary changes are assumed permanent. We divide the problem of evaluating welfare changes into two parts by writing the intertemporal utility function (6) as U = UR + UM, where UR consists of the terms depending on consumption and output and UM consists of the terms depending on real money balances.
Consider the change in UR first. Since the economy reaches a steady state after one period, the change in a home resident's lifetime welfare due to consumption and output changes is Thus the only effect of the money shock on UR and U*R comes from the general increase in world demand in the initial period, and both countries share the benefits equally. This is true despite the permanent increase in home relative consumption caused by the shock.
The fact that unanticipated monetary expansion can raise welfare is familiar from the static closed-economy analyses of Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) . Because price exceeds marginal cost in a monopolistic equilibrium, aggregate demand policies that coordinate higher work effort move the economy closer to efficient production, with a first-order impact on wel-fare. The surprising result in (62) and (63) is that the terms-of-trade and current-account effects that accompany unilateral monetary changes-effects long central to the international policy coordination literature-are of strictly second-order importance here. How can this be?
The crux of the matter is that if home producers lower prices and produce more, they gain revenue but work harder to get it. Starting in the initial equilibrium, where marginal revenue and cost are equal, the utility effects cancel exactly. An unexpected home-currency depreciation, which lowers the real price of home goods when domesticmoney prices are sticky, has the same effect: home producers sell more but work harder too. Foreign producers face the opposite situation. The first-order effect of the monetary expansion thus is to raise global aggregate demand and world output. The associated expenditure-switching effects are only second-order. Does the fact that a current-account imbalance arises upset this conclusion? No. Here, at the margin, all effects from reallocating consumption and leisure over time have to be second-order as well.
Obviously, our result holds in its extreme form only for small monetary expansions. For large shifts, the envelope theorem no longer applies and assessments of welfare outcomes require numerical methods. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that, even in cases in which the conventional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch paradigm yields empirically sensible results, its ostensible welfare implications can be quite misleading. For example, the earlier models may overstate the importance of the "beggar-thy-neighbor" effects that a country inflicts on trading partners when it depreciates its currency. Our theoretical analysis provides support for Eichengreen and Sachs's (1985) and Eichengreen's (1992) contention that, during the Great Depression, the global aggregate-demand benefits of unilateral inflationary devaluations were at least as important as the expenditure-switching effects.28 A crucial assumption underlying the model's welfare prediction is that producers' market power is the only distortion in the initial equilibrium. Home monetary expansion would not necessarily raise welfare in, say, a foreign economy with involuntary unemployment due to an efficiency-wage mechanism.
Our symmetrical international transmission result can similarly be reversed when distorting income taxes discourage labor effort. Sup-28 Embedded in our results is the assumption that initially there is no net international debt. If such debt were present, the fall in the interest rate caused by a monetary expansion would cause a first-order income redistribution from the creditor country to the debtor. pose, for example, that income from labor is taxed in both countries at rate T, with the proceeds being remitted to the private sector in lump-sum fashion. In this case, the expenditure-switching effect of a currency depreciation allows the home country to achieve an ex post reduction in its tax distortion at foreign expense. This can be seen Thus far we have not discussed real-balance effects, which change UM and U*M, but they should not reverse our conclusions. Because the marginal utility of money is positive, policies that raise real monetary balances can be Pareto improving. In the case of a unilateral home monetary expansion, home real balances rise in all periods. Foreign real balances, however, rise in the first period but fall in the long run because long-run foreign consumption falls. The net effect abroad is ambiguous. But unless X in (6) is implausibly large, so that real balances have a high weight in total welfare relative to consumption, the aggregate demand effects captured in (62) and (63) are the dominant ones.29 29 It can be shown that, for empirically reasonable parameter values, dU*M > 0. As we observed in n. 3, no such parameter restrictions need to be invoked in the cash-in-advance version of the model.
D. Government Spending Shocks
A government's spending falls on both home and foreign goods, but the taxes that finance it are borne entirely by its own citizens. Their consumption falls, but because they reduce their leisure at the same time, the net effect on world aggregate demand is positive. We have already studied government spending under flexible prices (in Sec. IIE); now we turn to the sticky-price case, in which the results can be surprisingly different. Again we draw on the log-linearized equations of Sections IID, IIE,_and IIIA, abstracting from monetary changes by assuming M = M = M* = M* = 0.
The solution approach is completely parallel to the one followed in Section IIIB. In particular, the MM schedule for this case is still given by equation (52) Figure 2 illustrates a permanent unilateral increase in home government spending, with dG = dG (in the case of a temporary change, the exchange rate and relative consumption effects would be muted). Home consumption falls relative to foreign consumption because domestic residents are paying for the government spending. Because this relative consumption change lowers the relative demand for home money, E rises (a depreciation of home currency relative to foreign).30 As in our analysis of monetary disturbances above, the exchange rate moves immediately to its new steady state, that is, E = E. This result does not require that the fiscal shock be permanent. Because individuals smooth consumption over time, even temporary fiscal shifts induce a random walk in the exchange rate.
To derive algebraic solutions for the model, one proceeds exactly as in the case of money shocks. (To simplify the resulting expressions, we hold G* at zero when this is convenient.) The short-run exchange rate change is The startling implication of equation (65) is that only innovations in future government spending affect the real interest rate. Current temporary innovations in government spending have no effect. With sticky prices and demand-determined output, global output rises by the same amount as government spending, so there is no change in the time path of output available for private consumption when the government spending increase is temporary. Equation (65) also shows that permanently higher government spending temporarily lowers the real interest rate. This contrasts with the textbook flexible-price result of an unchanged interest rate (Barro 1993) . Because an unexpected permanent rise in government spending generates a bigger output effect in the short run than in the long run, it results in a declining path of output available for private consumption. Obviously, some of the precise positive implications of our model depend on the exact manner in which government spending enters it. The standard intertemporal approach admits a plethora of possibilities (government purchases can be used for investment, government consumption can be a substitute for private consumption, etc.). One result likely to be fairly robust to changes in the specific details of the model, however, is that unanticipated increases in government spending do not raise interest rates as much (or lower them more) in 31 The result just mentioned does not generally hold in flexible-price economies with domestic investment. A permanent increase in government consumption may permanently reduce leisure, thus raising the long-run home stock of capital. The result is a rise in investment accompanied by a deficit in the current account. Baxter (1992) explores this mechanism. a world with short-run price rigidities as in a world with fully flexible prices.32 As was the case for monetary shocks, nominal exchange rates may be less volatile under sticky prices than under flexible prices. A consequence of equations (42), (43), and (23) is that the MM equation, E = -/E)(C -C*), holds in both the sticky-price and flexible-price cases for any fiscal shock (with money held constant). Thus the exchange rate impact of fiscal policy is proportional to the induced consumption differential regardless of whether prices are sticky or flexible. But from our preceding discussion of the current account, one can readily confirm that both temporary and permanent fiscal shocks have smaller absolute effects on relative consumption under sticky prices. Hence, the absolute exchange rate effects are smaller as well.
An explicit welfare analysis of fiscal policy along the lines of Section IIIC is straightforward. Again, the induced expenditure switching effects are of second-order significance. The major new issue that arises is that the citizens whose government expands foot the entire tax bill for the resulting expansion in world aggregate demand.
In concluding this section, we note that our analysis, which has focused entirely on monetary and fiscal policy shocks, can easily be extended to incorporate productivity shocks. They can be modeled as changes in the parameter K in equation (6); a fall in K can be interpreted as implying that less labor is required to produce a given amount of output. When K can vary, equations ( The model's dynamics can be extended in a number of dimensions. Introducing overlapping generations in place of homogeneous infinitely lived agents would enrich the dynamics while permitting real effects of government budget deficits. The analysis above considered only one-period nominal rigidities, but allowing for richer price dynamics would enhance the model's empirical applicability. The exclusion of domestic investment, while a useful strategic simplification for some purposes, prevents discussion of some important business cycle regularities.
Attempts to extend the framework clearly become much easier if one is willing to settle for numerical results rather than analytical ones. For many purposes (such as analyzing large shocks), resort to numerical methods is a necessary compromise. We believe, however, that analytical results such as those presented here are a vital aid to intuition, even intuition about more elaborate numerical models. > Several of the extensions discussed below, including the cash-in-advance model of money demand and applications to monetary policy credibility, are taken up in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chaps. 9, 10).
3 Explicitly introducing uncertainty would raise the question of international diversification of country-specific risks. In Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), we argue that the assumption made here-that risk-free bonds are the only assets countries trade-is a closer approximation to reality than the alternative extreme of complete statecontingent markets. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chap. 6) consider intermediate cases in which the degree of capital market completeness is endogenously determined. 36 Romer's (1993) related static model focuses on the credibility of monetary policy.
V. Conclusions
We have developed a framework that offers new foundations for thinking about some of the fundamental problems in international finance. Existing models, whether traditional static Keynesian models or newer flexible-price intertemporal models, are too incomplete to offer a satisfactory integrative treatment of exchange rates, output, and the current account. While our model is seemingly quite complex, it yields simple and intuitive insights into the international repercussions of monetary and fiscal policies. It can be extended in a number of dimensions, including the addition of nontraded goods, pricing to market behavior, home bias in government spending, labor market distortions, and so on. By design, our model inherits much of the empirical sensibility of the still-dominant Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch approach to international finance. We have gone beyond that essentially static approach in offering a framework that simultaneously handles current-account and exchange rate issues, as well as the dynamic repercussions of fiscal shifts. Most important, though, the new approach allows one to analyze meaningfully the welfare implications of alternative policies. We find that some of the intermediate policy targets emphasized in earlier Keynesian models of policy transmission (the terms of trade, the current account, and so on) turn out, on closer inspection, to be important individually but largely offsetting taken jointly. This would never be apparent without carefully articulated microfoundations.
Appendix

A Model with Nontraded Goods
Here we sketch a simple model of a small open economy with nontraded consumption goods in which exchange rate overshooting is possible. Now, the nontraded-goods sector is monopolistically competitive with preset nominal prices, but there is a single homogeneous tradable good that sells for the same price all over the world. The tradables sector is perfectly competitive, and therefore the money price of the tradable good is flexible. A home citizen is endowed with a constant quantity of the traded good each period, 5T, and has a monopoly over production of one of the nontradables z E [0, 1].
The utility function of the representative producer is Finally, observe that an unanticipated rise in money supply is unambiguously welfare improving at home: output rises in the monopolistic nontradedgoods sector and (as one can show) real money balances also rise.
